Diseases With Unknown Etiology Trace Back To Mass Vaccination Against Influenza in 1976

On February 3, 1976, the New Jersey State Health Department sent the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta isolates of virus from recruits at Fort Dix, New Jersey, who had influenza-like illnesses. Most of the isolates were identified as A/Victoria/75 (H3N2), the contemporary epidemic strain. Two of the isolates, however, were not typeable in that laboratory. On February 10, additional isolates were sent and identified in CDC laboratories as A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1), similar to the virus of the 1918 pandemic and better known as “swine flu.”

A meeting of representatives of the military, the National Institute of Health, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the State of New Jersey Department of Health was quickly convened on Saturday, February 14, 1976. Plans of action included heightened surveillance in and around Fort Dix, investigation of the ill recruits to determine if contact with pigs had occurred, and serologic testing of recruits to determine if spread had occurred at Fort Dix.

Surveillance activities at Fort Dix gave no indication that recruits had contact with pigs. Surveillance in the surrounding communities found influenza caused by the current strain of influenza, A/Victoria, but no additional cases of swine flu. Serologic testing at Fort Dix indicated that person-to-person transmission had occurred in >200 recruits (4).

In 1974 and 1975, 2 instances of humans infected with swine influenza viruses had been documented in the United States. Both persons involved had close contact with pigs, and no evidence for spread of the virus beyond family members with pig contact could be found (5).

On March 10, 1976, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the United States Public Health Service (ACIP) reviewed the findings. The committee concluded that with a new strain (the H1N1 New Jersey strain) that could be transmitted from person to person, a pandemic was a possibility. Specifically, the following facts were of concern: 1) persons <50 years of age had no antibodies to this new strain; 2) a current interpandemic strain (A/Victoria) of influenza was widely circulating; 3) this early detection of an outbreak caused by A/New Jersey/76/Hsw1N1 (H1N1) provided an opportunity to produce a vaccine since there was sufficient time between the initial isolates and the advent of an expected influenza season to produce vaccine. In the past when a new pandemic strain had been identified, there had not been enough time to manufacture vaccine on any large scale; 4) influenza vaccines had been used for years with demonstrated safety and efficacy when the currently circulating vaccine strain was incorporated; 5) the military vaccine formulation for years had included H1N1, an indication that production was possible, and no documented adverse effects had been described.

ACIP recommended that an immunization program be launched to prevent the effects of a possible pandemic. One ACIP member summarized the consensus by stating “If we believe in prevention, we have no alternative but to offer and urge the immunization of the population.” One ACIP member expressed the view that the vaccine should be stockpiled, not given.

Making this decision carried an unusual urgency. The pharmaceutical industry had just finished manufacture of the vaccine to be used in the 1976–1977 influenza season. At that time, influenza vaccine was produced in fertilized hen’s eggs from special flocks of hens. Roosters used for fertilizing the hens were still available; if they were slaughtered, as was customary, the industry could not resume production for several months.

On March 13, an action memo was presented to the Secretary of the Department of Health Education and Welfare (DHEW). It outlined the problem and presented 4 alternative courses of action. First was “business as usual,” with the marketplace prevailing and the assumption that a pandemic might not occur. The second was a recommendation that the federal government embark on a major program to immunize a highly susceptible population. As a reason to adopt this plan of action, the memo stated that “the Administration can tolerate unnecessary health expenditures better than unnecessary death and illness if a pandemic should occur.” The third proposed course of action was a minimal response, in which the federal government would contract for sufficient vaccine to provide for traditional federal beneficiaries—military personnel, Native Americans, and Medicare-eligible persons. The fourth alternative was a program that would represent an exclusively federal response without involvement of the states.

The proposal recommended by the director of CDC was the second course, namely, for the federal government to contract with private pharmaceutical companies to produce sufficient vaccine to permit the entire population to be immunized against H1N1. The federal government would make grants to state health departments to organize and conduct immunization programs. The federal government would provide vaccine to state health departments and private medical practices. Since influenza caused by A/Victoria was active worldwide, industry was asked to incorporate the swine flu into an A/Victoria product to be used for populations at high risk.

Before the discussions with the secretary of DHEW had been completed, a member of his staff sent a memo to a health policy advisor in the White House, raising the specter of the 1918 pandemic, which had been specifically underemphasized in the CDC presentation. CDC’s presentation highlighted the pandemic potential, comparing it with the 1968–69 Hong Kong and 1957–58 Asian pandemics. President Gerald Ford’s staff recommended that the president convene a large group of well-known and respected scientists (Albert Sabin and Jonas Salk had to be included) and public representatives to hear the government’s proposal and make recommendations to the president about it. After the meeting, the president had a press conference, highlighted by the unique simultaneous appearance of Salk and Sabin. President Ford announced that he accepted the recommendations that CDC had originally made to the secretary of DHEW. The National Influenza Immunization Program (NIIP) was initiated.

The proposal was presented to 4 committees of the Congress, House and Senate authorization committees and House and Senate appropriation committees. All 4 committees reported out favorable legislation, and an appropriation bill was passed and signed.

The estimated budgeted cost of the program was $137 million. When Congress passed the appropriation, newspapers mischaracterized the cost as “$1.9 billion” because the $137 million was included as part of a $1.9 billion supplemental appropriation for the Department of Labor. In the minds of the public, this misconception prevailed.

Immediately after the congressional hearing, a meeting of all directors of state health departments and medical societies was held at CDC. The program was presented by CDC, and attendees were asked for comments. A representative from the New Jersey state health department opposed the plan; the Wisconsin state medical society opposed any federal involvement. Otherwise, state and local health departments approved the plan.

Within CDC, a unit charged with implementing the program, which reported to the director, was established. This unit, NIIP, had complete authority to draw upon any resources at CDC needed. NIIP was responsible for relations with state and local health departments (including administration of the grant program for state operations, technical advice to the procurement staff for vaccine, and warehousing and distribution of the vaccine to state health departments) and established a proactive system of surveillance for possible adverse effects of the influenza vaccines, the NIIP Surveillance Assessment Center (NIIP-SAC). (This innovative surveillance system would prove to be NIIP’s Trojan horse.) In spite of the obstacles discussed below, NIIP administered a program that immunized 45 million in 10 weeks, which resulted in doubling the level of immunization for persons deemed to be at high risk, rapidly identifying adverse effects, and developing and administering an informed consent form for use in a community-based program.

The principal obstacle was the lack of vaccines. As test batches were prepared, the largest ever field trials of influenza vaccines ensued. The vaccines appeared efficacious and safe (although in the initial trials, children did not respond immunologically to a single dose of vaccine, and a second trial with a revised schedule was needed) (6). Hopes were heightened for a late summer/early fall kickoff of mass immunization operations.

In January 1976, before the New Jersey outbreak, CDC had proposed legislation that would have compensated persons damaged as a result of immunization when it was licensed by FDA and administered in the manner recommended by ACIP. The rationale given was that immunization protects the community as well as the individual (a societal benefit) and that when a person participating in that societal benefit is damaged, society had a responsibility to that person. The proposal was sent back from a staff member in the Surgeon General’s office with a handwritten note, “This is not a problem.”

Soon, however, NIIP received the first of 2 crippling blows to hopes to immunize “every man, woman, and child.” The first was later in 1976, when instead of boxes of bottled vaccine, the vaccine manufacturers delivered an ultimatum—that the federal government indemnify them against claims of adverse reactions as a requirement for release of the vaccines. The government quickly capitulated to industry’s demand for indemnification. While the manufacturers’ ultimatum reflected the trend of increased litigiousness in American society, its unintended, unmistakable subliminal message blared “There’s something wrong with this vaccine.” This public misperception, warranted or not, ensured that every coincidental health event that occurred in the wake of the swine flu shot would be scrutinized and attributed to the vaccine.

On August 2, 1976, deaths apparently due to an influenzalike illness were reported from Pennsylvania in older men who had attended the convention of the American Legion in Philadelphia. A combined team of CDC and state and local health workers immediately investigated. By the next day, epidemiologic evidence indicated that the disease was not influenza (no secondary cases occurred in the households of the patients). By August 4, laboratory evidence conclusively ruled out influenza. However, this series of events was interpreted by the media and others as an attempt by the government to “stimulate” NIIP.

Shortly after the national campaign began, 3 elderly persons died after receiving the vaccine in the same clinic. Although investigations found no evidence that the vaccine and deaths were causally related, press frenzy was so intense it drew a televised rebuke from Walter Cronkite for sensationalizing coincidental happenings.

Guillain-Barré Syndrome

What NIIP did not and could not survive, however, was the second blow, finding cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) among persons receiving swine flu immunizations. As of 1976, >50 “antecedent events” had been identified in temporal relationship to GBS, events that were considered as possible factors in its cause. The list included viral infections, injections, and “being struck by lightning.” Whether or not any of the antecedents had a causal relationship to GBS was, and remains, unclear. When cases of GBS were identified among recipients of the swine flu vaccines, they were, of course, well covered by the press. Because GBS cases are always present in the population, the necessary public health questions concerning the cases among vaccine recipients were “Is the number of cases of GBS among vaccine recipients higher than would be expected? And if so, are the increased cases the result of increased surveillance or a true increase?” Leading epidemiologists debated these points, but the consensus, based on the intensified surveillance for GBS (and other conditions) in recipients of the vaccines, was that the number of cases of GBS appeared to be an excess.

Had H1N1 influenza been transmitted at that time, the small apparent risk of GBS from immunization would have been eclipsed by the obvious immediate benefit of vaccine-induced protection against swine flu. However, in December 1976, with >40 million persons immunized and no evidence of H1N1 transmission, federal health officials decided that the possibility of an association of GBS with the vaccine, however small, necessitated stopping immunization, at least until the issue could be explored. A moratorium on the use of the influenza vaccines was announced on December 16; it effectively ended NIIP of 1976. Four days later the New York Times published an op-ed article that began by asserting, “Misunderstandings and misconceptions… have marked Government … during the last eight years,” attributing NIIP and its consequences to “political expediency” and “the self interest of government health bureaucracy” (7). These simple and sinister innuendos had traction, as did 2 epithets used in the article to describe the program, “debacle” in the text and “Swine Flu Fiasco” in the title.

On February 7, the new secretary of DHEW, Joseph A. Califano, announced the resumption of immunization of high-risk populations with monovalent A/Victoria vaccine that had been prepared as part of the federal contracts, and he dismissed the director of CDC.

NIIP may offer lessons for today’s policymakers, who are faced with a potential pandemic of avian influenza and struggling with decisions about preventing it (Table). Two of these lessons bear further scrutiny here.

Media and Presidential Attention

While all decisions related to NIIP had been reached in public sessions (publishing of the initial virus findings in CDC’s weekly newsletter, the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR); New York Times reporter Harold Schmeck’s coverage of the ACIP sessions, the president’s press conference, and 4 congressional hearings), effective communication from scientifically qualified persons was lacking, and the perception prevailed that the program was motivated by politics rather than science. In retrospect (and to some observers at the time), the president’s highly visible convened meeting and subsequent press conference, which included pictures of his being immunized, were mistakes. These instances seemed to underline the suspicion that the program was politically motivated, rather than a public health response to a possible catastrophe.Annex 11 of the draft DHEW pandemic preparedness plan states, “For policy decisions and in communication, making clear what is not known is as important as stating what is known. When assumptions are made, the basis for the assumptions and the uncertainties surrounding them should be communicated” (11). This goal is much better accomplished if the explanations are communicated by those closest to the problem, who can give authoritative scientific information. Scientific information coming from a nonscientific political figure is likely to encourage skepticism, not enthusiasm.

Neither CDC nor the health agencies of the federal government had been in the habit of holding regular press conferences. CDC considered that its appropriate main line of communication was to states and local health departments, believing that they were best placed to communicate with the public. MMWR served both a professional and public audience and accounted for much of CDC’s press coverage. In 1976, no all-news stations existed, only the nightly news. The decision to stop the NIIP on December 16, 1976, was announced by a press release from the office of the assistant secretary for health. The decision to reinstitute the immunization of those at high risk was announced by a press release from the office of the secretary, DHEW. In retrospect, periodic press briefings would have served better than responding to press queries. The public must understand that decisions are based on public health, not politics. To this end, health communication should be by health personnel through a regular schedule of media briefings.

Decision To Begin Immunization

This decision is worthy of serious question and debate. As Walter Dowdle (12) points out in this issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases, the prevailing wisdom was that a pandemic could be expected at any time. Public health officials were concerned that if immunization was delayed until H1N1 was documented to have spread to other groups, the disease would spread faster than any ability to mobilize preventive vaccination efforts. Three cases of swine influenza had recently occurred in persons who had contact with pigs. In 1918, after the initial outbreak of influenza at Fort Riley in April, widespread outbreaks of influenza did not occur until late summer (13).

The Delphi exercise of Schoenbaum in early fall of 1976 (13) was the most serious scientific undertaking to poll scientists to decide whether or not to continue the program. Its main finding was that the cost benefit would be best if immunization were limited to those >25 years of age (and now young children are believed to be a potent source of spread of influenza virus!). Unfortunately, no biblical Joseph was there to rise from prison and interpret the future.

As Dowdle further states (12), risk assessment and risk management are separate functions. But they must come together with policymakers, who must understand both. These discussions should not take place in large groups in the president’s cabinet room but in an environment that can establish an educated understanding of the situation. Once the policy decisions are made, implementation should be left to a single designated agency. Advisory groups should be small but representative. CDC had the lead responsibility for operation of the program. Implementation by committee does not work. Within CDC, a unit was established for program execution, including surveillance, outbreak investigation, vaccine procurement and distribution, assignment of personnel to states, and awarding and monitoring grants to the states. Communications up the chain of command to the policymakers and laterally to other directly involved federal agencies were the responsibility of the CDC director, not the director of NIIP, who was responsible for communications to the states and local health departments, those ultimately implementing operations of the program. This organizational mode functioned well, a tribute to the lack of interagency jealousies.

[End of Excerpt]

Source Article from http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Collective-evolution/~3/N834izFHfjk/

‘Unknown’ soldiers: US won’t disclose location of thousands of its troops

In accordance with the 1973 War Powers Resolution, the Trump administration provided Congress on Monday with a semi-annual report accounting for US military personnel stationed abroad. Although the reports are meant to make the executive branch more accountable for US troop deployments, Monday’s report left out the number of US troops operating in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Cameroon.

The Trump administration has argued that concealing troop numbers would prevent America’s enemies from gaining a strategic advantage. However, in a previous report in June, the White House listed 8,448 Americans serving in Afghanistan, 5,262 in Iraq, and 503 in Syria. The latest briefing for Congress does not provide figures for those war zones or a reason for their omission.

While the White House deemed troop numbers too sensitive to disclose, last week the Pentagon told reporters that 5,200 Americans were serving in Iraq and another 2,000 in Syria, about four times as many troops as previously reported.

The Pentagon also said that it could not disclose the location of tens of thousands of its personnel stationed across the globe.

A report compiled by the Defense Manpower Data Center under the Office of the Secretary of Defense shows more than 44,000 personnel in a category labeled “Unknown,”   according to Stars and Stripes, a US military newspaper.

The United States maintains approximately 800 military bases in more than 70 countries and territories abroad. US military personnel are stationed in 150 different countries.

“Our commitment is to be as transparent as we can, within the constraints of operational security,” Army Col. Rob Manning, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters last week. The Pentagon claimed in a statement that it is unable to accurately assess how many US military personnel are stationed overseas, where they were or even when they were there.

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has previously expressed frustration with the Pentagon’s accounting techniques, ordering a review of how US troops are counted while serving overseas.

“There’s a very strange accounting procedure I inherited … What I’m probably going to end up doing is outputting everyone into one thing and saying, ‘Here’s how many are really there now,'” Mattis said during a news conference in August.

The Department of Defense announced its first-ever audit in December.

The massive undertaking will require 2,400 auditors to review the Pentagon’s $2.4 trillion in assets, including personnel, real estate and weapons.

Source Article from https://www.rt.com/usa/412852-us-troops-abroad-congress-pentagon/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=RSS

The Almost Unknown part of the Hannukah story–the religiously-mandated massacre of Hellenized Jews

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Source Article from https://theuglytruth.wordpress.com/2017/12/02/the-almost-unknown-part-of-the-hannukah-story-the-religiously-mandated-massacre-of-hellenized-jews/

Police Confirm ‘Unknown’ Operatives Raided Las Vegas Shooter’s Home

Suspected Las Vegas shooting gunman Stephen Paddock’s Reno home was searched by operatives “unknown” to either the FBI or the police.

Federal agents returned to the property this week to conduct an official search only to be told by police officers that “someone” had already raided the property over the weekend.

Reno police officer Tim Broadway said they were called to a suspected break-in at the home owned by Paddock, in the early hours of Sunday morning, after a neighbor called 911 to report seeing a flashlight inside the building.

Broadway said officers discovered evidence that “someone had broken into the house”, but confirmed that it wasn’t a robbery or a typical break-in.

Police say they have “no idea” how the operatives entered the house and they remain “unknown” to law enforcement, with witnesses not seeing anything other than the light inside.“

Nobody really saw anything, just a light in the residence,” Broadway told the Associated Press.

According to RT, Broadway believes professional sleuths broke into the home through the front door over the weekend but said he was not sure exactly how they gained entry.

Police are not aware of any damages or anything that was stolen.There are no suspects at this time or any descriptions of a suspect.

The FBI is working with Reno police to ensure “there are no further incidents,” Broadway told the Reno-Gazette Journal.

The incident points towards being the work of intelligence agents, who would typically operate without liaising with police or even federal investigators.

At this point, it’s unclear whether the mission was designed to find something in the property, or perhaps, leave something behind prior to the FBI’s next search.

Paddock, 64, bought the house in the upscale retirement community in 2013 and lived there with his girlfriend, Marilou Danley.

Investigators previously searched the residence on October 3 and found five handguns, two shotguns, numerous electronic devices and a “plethora of ammunition,” according to KOLO.

During a news conference Monday, Las Vegas Sheriff Joseph Lombardo said the FBI and behavioral analysis agents were revisiting Paddock’s properties in order to possibly “discern additional evidence.”

via:

www.nnettle

Source Article from https://worldtruth.tv/police-confirm-unknown-operatives-raided-las-vegas-shooters-home/

Seven members of Syria's White Helmets shot dead by unknown gunmen

Seven member of the Syrian White Helmets rescue group were shot dead by unknown gunmen on Saturday, sparking a manhunt and deep suspicions in the rebel-controlled province of Idlib.

The men were killed in their operations centre in the village of Sarmin at dawn on Saturday. Two of their vehicles as well as several of their distinctive white helmets were stolen, the group said.  

Many White Helmet volunteers have been killed in airstrikes during the six year Syrian war but opposition activists said it was the first time that members had been shot dead like this. 

Photographs from the scene showed the volunteers’ bodies lying across the floor of the centre and blood splashed over the logo of the White Helmets group. All had been shot execution-style at close range. 

A member of the Syrian civil defence volunteers mourns his comrades - Credit: AFP PHOTO / OMAR HAJ KADOURA member of the Syrian civil defence volunteers mourns his comrades - Credit: AFP PHOTO / OMAR HAJ KADOUR

“The heart is saddened, there are tears in our eyes for you departure,” said Raed al-Saleh, the founder of the White Helmets. “May God strengthen us and make us patient for facing this tragedy.”

One of the men killed was Mohammed Abu Kifah, who appeared in a widely-shared video last year where he wept with emotion after rescuing a baby girl from the rubble of a bombed-out building. 

The White Helmets have been lauded by Western countries for saving civilian lives in opposition areas in Syria and in 2016 they narrowly missed out on winning the Nobel Peace prize. 

But the group also operates in areas controlled by jihadists and supporters of the Assad regime regularly accuse them of allying with terrorists.

Idlib province is now mainly controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist rebel group that is dominated by jihadists linked to al-Qaeda. 

Activists in Idlib said they were baffled by the killings but did not think that HTS was responsible. The group has not targeted White Helmets in the past. 

One theory was that agents of the Assad regime had killed the men to create suspicion and distrust between rival rebel groups. 

The murdered White Helmets were buried on Saturday in Idlib - Credit: OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP/Getty ImagesThe murdered White Helmets were buried on Saturday in Idlib - Credit: OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP/Getty Images

HTS recently fought an open battle against Ahrar al-Sham, another prominent rebel group, and there is lingering distrust in Idlib as a result. 

“The ones who did this are clever. They want to make conflicts worse between the rebel groups and show that there is no security and no safety in the opposition areas,” said Abdulkafe al-Hamdo, an English teacher in Idlib. 

Another theory is that the killings were the work of a criminal gang, who wanted to steal equipment from the White Helmets centre. Two vans were taken from the centre as well as several motorcycles and some walkie-talkie equipment. 

One of the vans was later found burned out on the edge of a field several miles from the centre.

The White Helmets centre is close to several other houses in the village of Sarmin but neighbours said they had not heard any gunfire during the night. That raises the possibility the White Helmets were killed with silenced weapons. 

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) has released videos in the past showing its fighters using guns equipped with silencers. The Assad regime also has access to silencers through its allies in Russia and Syria.   

Mr al-Hamdo said members of the group had last been seen on Whatsapp at around 1am, suggesting they were killed sometime after that. 

Gareth Bayley, Britain’s special representative for Syria, condemned the killings. 

HTS has a network of checkpoints around Idlib province and activists said they hoped that the group’s fighters would be able to catch the killers. 

Idlib is one of the last major opposition strongholds in Syria and faces intense bombardment by the Assad regime and its Russian allies.

Many of the fighters and civilians the opposition areas of Aleppo fled to Idlib after the city fell in late 2016.  

Source Article from https://www.yahoo.com/news/seven-members-syria-apos-white-130042290.html

Follow the money! The unknown reasons doctors push vaccines

    

Blue Cross, Blue Shield, Blue Care Network of Michigan publishes online a shameless and bold report of how much cash they reward physicians for performing certain tests, and which apparently acts as an incentive to over-prescribe, thus inflating the costs of U.S. healthcare, which should be illegal.

Blue Cross/Blue Shield published the 2016 Performance Recognition Program, a 28-page report indicating how medical insurance companies actually increase the costs of healthcare!

Look what we find on the BC/BS page “Childhood Immunizations-Combo 10”!

If MDs meet a target of 63% of eligible member patients, they will receive a payout of $400 per completed eligible member. Wow! Now you know one of the key reasons why parents are hounded to vaccinate their infants and toddlers. Gelt, pecunia, greenbacks-whatever you call M-O-N-E-Y.

    

Parents should note in the State of Michigan, 2 influenza (flu) vaccines are required for a child by 2 years of age. No consideration, however, is given to the biochemical fact flu vaccines actually weaken the immune system [1] long-term.

Furthermore, according to Dr. Joseph Mercola, DO, “Foreign DNA/RNA from animal tissues [components of vaccines] can wreak havoc in your body and trigger autoimmunity in some people. [1]

Get a load of this: U.S. News reported “Flu Vaccine Ineffective for People 65 and Older Last Winter” [2016-17]. The News subtitle for that article was – Officials: Last winter’s flu vaccine was essentially ineffective in protecting older Americans against the illness.

With this candid admission:

But flu is particularly challenging. Over the last ten winters, overall flu vaccine effectiveness has averaged about 46 percent. [A “pig-in-a-poke”?]

Source: above U.S. News report

And yet doctors are incentivized to earn ‘prize money’ for pushing flu vaccines on infants and adults!

Are you aware physicians/MDs even earn “stars” for how many medical tests they prescribe per member, per month for Medicare PRP measures? Page No. 17

How about $250 per service completed for each eligible member providing an MD has reached a 68% target for diabetes type 1 and 2! However, there are exclusions to earning those cash rewards: “Diagnosis of gestational or steroid-induced diabetes, in any setting, during 2015 or 2016 …” [Page 18], which means diabetes during pregnancy or prescription steroid-induced diabetes! Did you know steroids can give you diabetes? Would that fall under the category of “iatrogenesis” [3]? Here are the top ten steroids prescribed.

If a doctor achieves 75% target, then he/she will receive $100 per service completed for each eligible member for controlling hypertension (high blood pressure). Page No. 20 Is that why some patients can be taking as many as three blood pressure meds at the same time?

How ironic! The medical profession years ago was so anxious to promote cigarette smoking in advertisements of the 1940s [2], but now MDs can earn $30 per Smoking/Tobacco Cessation counseling for each eligible member. Page No. 23

How much did the tobacco companies pay MDs for their ‘testimonials’? Subsequently, that tobacco industry-medical profession grave scientific and medical mistake is referred to as ‘tobacco science’.

    

In my opinion, medical professionals, who huckster their credentials as MDs did with tobacco use, need to be taken less seriously as to how much they really know about medical science and biochemistry. Essentially, are some con-artists?


Comment: Ignoring vaccine safety questions – are doctors being trained to manipulate patients?

This new strategy has been featured in several recent news magazines sent to all pediatricians and was unveiled at the Confronting Vaccine Resistance Conference in New York, hosted by Senator Pan (D-California) and Dr. Offit (creator of the rotavirus vaccine). They’ve determined that pediatricians who capitalize on the emotion of the doctor-patient relationship may be more successful in persuading parents who won’t follow the full vaccine protocol to change their mind.

All the above may seem incredulous to parents, especially those with vaccine-injured children, as to why pediatricians and family physicians push vaccines so rabidly. Well, nothing explains the unconscionable reasoning and actions physicians take regarding mandating vaccines than the old adage:

Follow the money”! And here’s proof!

Blue Cross Blue Shield Pays Your Doctor A $40,000 Bonus For Fully Vaccinating 100 Patients Under The Age of 2

If your pediatrician recommends that your child under the age of 2 receive the flu vaccine-even though the flu vaccine has never been studied in very young children and evidence suggests that the flu vaccine actually weakens a person’s immune system over the long term-ask yourself: Is my doctor more concerned with selling me vaccines to keep my child healthy or to send his child to private school? [CJF emphasis] Source

Let’s add to that one more obvious criterion-out of many-why vaccines are pushed as the best ‘health’ preventive measure ever invented. Vaccines fall under the purview of the U.S. military, which drives the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which owns numerous vaccine patents.

According to Sayer Ji of Green Med Info:

There are CDC patents applicable to vaccines for Flu, Rotavirus, Hepatitis A, HIV, Anthrax, Rabies, Dengue fever, West Nile virus, Group A Strep, Pneumococcal disease, Meningococcal disease, RSV, Gastroenteritis, Japanese encephalitis, SARS, Rift Valley Fever, and chlamydophila pneumoniae.

There is a CDC patent for “Nucleic acid vaccines for prevention of flavivirus infection,” which has applications in vaccines for Zika, West Nile virus, Dengue fever, tick-borne encephalitis virus, yellow fever, Palm Creek virus, and Parramatta River virus.

CDC also has several patents for administering various”shots” via aerosol delivery systems for vaccines.

There’s a CDC patent on a process for vaccine quality control by “quantifying proteins in a complex preparation of uni- or multivalent commercial or research vaccine preparations.”

There’s a CDC patent on a method “for producing a model for evaluating the antiretroviral effects of drugs and vaccines.” [4]

Here’s what every person needs to factor into the U.S. medical/health insurance system and its pervasive cult or religious-like belief regarding vaccines, which are nothing short of neurotoxic cocktails pumped into infants, toddlers, teens, adults and seniors:

The average American pediatrician has 1546 patients, though some pediatricians see many more. The vast majority of those patients are very young, perhaps because children transition to a family physician or stop visiting the doctor at all as they grow up. As they table above explains, Blue Cross Blue Shield pays pediatricians $400 per fully vaccinated child. If your pediatrician has just 100 fully-vaccinated patients turning 2 this year, that’s $40,000. Yes, Blue Cross Blue Shield pays your doctor a $40,000 bonus for fully vaccinating 100 patients under the age of 2. If your doctor manages to fully vaccinate 200 patients, that bonus jumps to $80,000. (Source: CongitiveTruths.com)

Healthcare consumers, it’s not about health; apparently it’s about follow the money, even if it harms innocent children and adults! Please consider all the above as only one of the reasons why U.S. healthcare and health insurance cost so damn much.



References

[1]mercola.com

[2] tobacco.stanford.edu

[3]wikipedia.org

[4]greenmedinfo.com

Resource

Vaccination Voodoo, What YOU Don’t Know About Vaccines

Source Article from https://www.sott.net/article/359051-Follow-the-money-The-unknown-reasons-doctors-push-vaccines